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Abstract 
Little is known about variation in the efficacy of financial participation across countries. 
This article examines the relationship between two types of financial participation (profit 
sharing and employee share-ownership) and labour productivity across 29 European 
countries using a representative workplace survey. Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, profit-sharing is associated with superior labour productivity when it is open 
to all employees, whilst the evidence for employee share-ownership is more mixed. 
Analysis reveals considerable variation in the efficacy of both schemes across Europe. 
Country-level collective bargaining coverage has the greatest explanatory power in 
accounting for cross-country variation in efficacy. In countries with higher levels of 
collective bargaining coverage, profit-sharing performs less well, whereas employee 
share-ownership performs better, relative to countries with lower collective bargaining 
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coverage. These findings shed light on the comparative dimension of the of the financial 
participation-labour productivity link. 
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Introduction 
Interest in financial participation has been revived in recent years (Blasi et al., 2013a). A 
large-scale project by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), summarised 
in the book Shared Capitalism at Work (Kruse et al., 2010), makes the persuasive case 
for the potential benefits to American organisations in adopting “shared capitalism,” or 
financial participation as it is known in Europe,1 demonstrating that employees in 
workplaces engaging in financial participation generally have more positive attitudes than 
employees in workplaces that do not. In this book, the researchers provide probably the 
most comprehensive review of studies to date on the connection between financial 
participation and workplace performance, stating that “evidence from over 100 studies 
indicates a positive association on average between programs [sic] and company 
performance, but with substantial dispersion in results” (Blasi et al., 2010: 142). Although 
a recent literature has begun to examine variation in the incidence of financial incentive 
and participation across countries (Bryson et al., 2013), research on describing this 
dispersion in effect sizes with respect to workplace performance across countries lags 
behind (Freeman et al., 2009). 
In this article, we contribute to the financial participation literature by presenting 
new evidence from a cross-national European workplace-level survey on the relationship 
between profit-sharing and employee share-ownership and workplace labour 
productivity. Consistent with theoretical expectations, we show that profit-sharing is most 
strongly associated with superior workplace labour productivity, especially when it is 
open to all employees within an establishment. We also show, however, that there exists 
                                                          
1 “Shared capitalism” refers to the financial mechanisms that explicitly give employees an opportunity to 
receive a slice of organisational gains based on organisational performance (Bryson and Freeman et al. 
2007; Kruse, Freeman, et al. 2010). 
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considerable variation across countries in the efficacy of both schemes, net of the 
different workplace compositions across countries, implying a role for country-level 
factors. We investigate three country-level factors that might account for some of this 
variation: country-level rates of financial participation, the extent of collective 
bargaining, and employment protection legislation. Out of these three factors, we find 
that country-level collective bargaining relates to the variation in the efficacy of financial 
participation most strongly, reducing the efficacy of profit-sharing, especially when it is 
only open to specific categories of employees, and enhancing the efficacy of employee 
share-ownership, especially when it is open to all workers in an establishment. By 
focusing on variation in efficacy across countries, our findings provide the first step into 
examining the comparative dimension to the financial participation and performance 
literature. 
Financial participation and labour productivity 
One reason why workplaces engage employees in sharing organisational gains, and often 
why governments support it, is the hope that by doing so, labour productivity should 
improve. The exact mechanisms as to why productivity might improve are quite 
numerous. The most basic theory is through a direct incentive effect inducing higher 
effort, as with any form of continent pay. This increased effort should also be directed 
towards activities that are aligned with the interests of the organisation in the form of 
profits or share prices. However, there are some potential shortcomings to any direct 
incentive effect. Being a collective incentive,they are exposed to the possibility of free-
riding. There are also many factors other than effort influencing profits and share-prices 
(i.e. “the line of sight problem”) which could mitigate motivational effects. Against this, 
evidence from the US shows financial participation is associated with greater  worker co-
monitoring (Kruse et al., 2010) and, from the United Kingdom, a more efficient allocation 
of more difficult tasks to better performers (Burgess et al., 2010). Other mechanisms 
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include more committed and cooperative workers that are less likely to leave (Blasi et al., 
2010; Harden et al., 2010). The research to date has also pointed to important interactions 
of financial participation with the presence of supportive HR practices such as employee 
involvement (Pendleton and Robinson, 2010), or company culture (Kruse et al., 2012). 
Different configurations of workplace arrangements across countries, then, could perhaps 
account for some within-country dispersion in effect sizes, but also between-countries 
too, and so workplace characteristics must be adequately controlled to isolate between-
country variation. 
Variation in efficacy across countries 
A large literature has focused on the association between financial participation and 
various performance outcomes, mostly employee attitudes, financial performance, and 
labour productivity, the latter the focus of this study. By and large, effects are positive.2 
However, there is likely much variation depending on the type financial participation 
under consideration, the outcome measure, time period, and the country—with the latter 
not yet investigated in detail. UK evidence has been supportive of a positive connection 
with labour productivity, especially in terms of employee share-ownership (Conyon and 
Freeman, 2004; Bryson and Freeman, 2007; Oxera, 2007; Robinson and Wilson, 2006). 
Jones (2004) finds employee share-ownership is associated with improved productivity 
in several Eastern European countries too. These findings are in contrast to a recent panel 
study on Finish data that found no association of employee share-ownership on 
productivity there (Jones et al., 2010). Other more recent studies have focused on 
financial performance, for example, Poutsma and Braam (2012) use panel data to show 
                                                          
2 We mainly focus on studies published in the 2000s and later, for earlier reviews that arrive at similar 
conclusions covering an array of countries including the countries we consider in this article, see 
Doucouliagos (1995), Jones and Pliskin (1997), and Kruse and Blasi (1997). Also see Blasi, Freeman, and 
Kruse (2013) for an up-to-date and detailed analysis of the US evidence. 
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positive financial effects in the Netherlands for profit-sharing and employee share-
ownership, where productivity effects might be inferred. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
conclude anything about the extent of variation in efficacy from single-country studies. 
Probably the most complete review of the literature, of over 100 studies from the 
United States, Europe, and elsewhere,  found that financial participation is positively 
associated with workplace performance – and importantly – also underlined that there is 
a substantial variation in effect sizes (Blasi et al., 2010: 142). It is this substantial 
dispersion – cross-national variation in particular – that we investigate in this article. 
Several studies have attempted to examine this using comparable cross-national 
workplace data, but they largely focused on understanding within-country relationships. 
Kalmi, Pendleton et al. (2005) using comparable data from four European countries found 
positive effects for employee share-ownership but not profit-sharing on financial 
performance. Poutsma, Brewster, et al. (2009) using the larger 2004 Cranet survey 
covering 32 countries, most of which were European, found that profit-sharing was 
associated with superior performance whereas employee share-ownership was not.  
Although suggestive, the above studies do not examine variation in effect sizes 
across countries. How much does the efficacy of financial participation vary across 
countries? Where is financial participation associated with the largest and smallest 
effects? Can patterns of cross-country variation be adequately accounted for by variation 
in country-level factors? If so, which factors? How does variation differ between profit-
sharing versus employee share-ownership? How does variation differ between schemes 
open to only specific categories of employee versus schemes open to all employees? 
These are important questions, especially in the European context, as the European Union 
has taken much interest in financial participation and made attempts to promote it through 
consultation with stakeholders and commissioning and disseminating reports such as the 
four “PEPPER” reports (Promotion of Employee Participation in Profit and Enterprise 
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Results) and through the European Economic and Social Committee and European 
Parliament (Pendleton and Poutsma, 2004). We next outline five hypotheses relating to 
expected patterns of variation. 
 
Hypotheses 
Although previous research suggests generally positive effects, it is also suggestive of 
considerable variation in effect sizes across scheme types and countries, which we aim to 
flesh out in this article. In terms of variation between profit-sharing and employee share-
ownership schemes, reviews on the financial participation-labour productivity connection 
generally observe larger effect sizes for profit-sharing than for employee share-ownership 
(Doucouliagos, 1995; Kruse and Blasi, 1997). This is also consistent with more recent 
empirical work on Europe (Poutsma, Brewster, et al. (2009). Part of the reason could be 
because profit-sharing is more likely to have an effect on short-term outcomes related to 
effort, whereas employee share-ownership is more likely to have positive effects on 
longer-term outcomes related to commitment such as financial performance and 
retention. With productivity being a short-term outcome, and consistent with expectations 
from the previous evidence, we would expect profit-sharing to have larger overall effect 
sizes than employee share-ownership, and potentially therefore also exhibit less variation 
in efficacy across countries.  
Hypothesis 1.  Profit-sharing generally has stronger effects on labour productivity than 
employee share-ownership across countries 
Another element of dispersion in effect sizes concern the design of the scheme 
itself. Although there are potentially many aspects in the design to consider, the one we 
are able to determine with the data we use is whether financial participation schemes are 
open to part or all the workforce within a workplace. We generally expect that the micro 
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mechanisms outlined above regarding the incentive/commitment effects and worker co-
monitoring above to be stronger in contexts where the whole workplace is covered by the 
scheme simply because if more workers are covered, the greater the likelihood an effect 
will be observed in relation to labour productivity, which is measured at the workplace 
level. Pendleton and Robinson (2010) provide evidence for this logic, demonstrating 
stronger productivity effects for employee share-ownership when more workers are 
covered within a workplace in the UK. As such, we expect effects sizes to generally be 
larger when all employees are eligible for a scheme, and too, perhaps less complete 
coverage schemes will exhibit less variation across countries than schemes open to 
specific categories of employee. 
Hypothesis 2. Financial participation generally has stronger effects on labour 
productivity when all employees in a workplace are covered across countries 
Our main focus is on effect sizes across countries. A fairly recent literature has 
begun to examine the relationship between country-level factors and variation in the 
diffusion of financial participation across countries, in particular within Europe (Bryson 
et al., 2013; Kalmi et al., 2013; Pendleton and Poutsma, 2004; Pendleton et al., 2003), 
and to a lesser extent, variation in performance outcomes (Poutsma et al., 2009; Freeman 
et al., 2009). As well as accounting for incidence, country-level factors could account for 
variation in the relationship between financial participation and labour productivity 
through influencing the functioning of schemes once adopted. We identify three sets of 
country-level factors from the literature. 
The first country-level factor we consider is country-level rates of financial 
participation. There are two reasons for examining this as a potential factor. First, the 
degree of country-level variation in propensity to adopt financial participation schemes 
could account for some degree of cross-sectional between-country variation in effect 
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sizes. Country-level financial participation rates can be viewed, partly, as an indicator of 
governmental encouragement for financial participation. Governments often offer tax 
breaks on payments made under financial participation schemes, or might encourage its 
use through other forms of regulation (Pendleton et al., 2001). In some countries, such as 
France, large organisations have historically been more or less compelled to adopt profit-
sharing, and, further for it to apply to all employees through intéressement. In some 
Eastern European counties, indirect governmentally-supported diffusion of employee 
share-ownership stemmed from mass privatisation of former public enterprises, when 
many employees were given shares as part of this process,  as was partly the cases in other 
European countries too (Poutsma et al., 2009). Similarly, some evidence demonstrates 
that rates of diffusion vary across countries depending on capital market development 
(Bryson et al., 2013). Governmental support and other country-level factors affecting 
diffusion could alter the potential operating costs of adopting profit-sharing or employee 
share-ownership in one country compared to another, and so could influence observed 
patterns in effect sizes on productivity across countries. In countries with greater levels 
of governmental diffusion, we might expect effect sizes to be smaller as the predicted 
positive association with labour productivity might be diluted by the adoption of financial 
participation by workplaces where it is least efficacious, because of the lower costs of 
adoption, such as through government support. Similarly, in countries with lower levels 
of diffusion, we might expect the observed effect sizes of financial participation on labour 
productivity to be larger partly because only those workplaces where the effects are likely 
to be most efficacious make use of it, and those workplaces where it is likely to be least 
efficacious are not compelled to adopt it. Thus we might expect the difference in labour 
productivity between workplaces that adopt financial participation and those that do not 
to be smaller in countries where rates of diffusion are higher, simply because of a greater 
heterogeneity with respect to productivity in the workplaces that adopt financial 
participation, partly reflecting different levels of self-selection across countries. 
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The second and related reason for including country-level rates of diffusion is that 
it is an important country-level control when considering other country-level factors. 
Controlling for country-rates of diffusion at the country-level changes the interpretation 
of other country-level factors as being net of the general country-level propensity to adopt 
financial participation, some of which may be due to government support, but also some 
of which might be due to other unmeasured country-level factors such as country-level 
culture and other long-term historical factors affecting diffusion. In terms of the 
correlation between financial participation effect sizes, the foregoing implies a negative 
correlation between country-level rates of diffusion and effect sizes across countries. 
Hypothesis 3. Country-level rates of financial participation are negatively correlated 
with the efficacy of financial participation on labour productivity. 
The second country-level factor we consider is country-level collective bargaining 
coverage. Previous studies have focused on how between-country differences in 
industrial relations arrangements, in particular the extent to which pay is determined via 
collective bargaining within a country affects the diffusion of types of contingent pay, 
including financial participation. Kalmi et al. (2013) find empirical support for a model 
with 32 countries in the CRANET survey. The model predicts that profit-sharing and 
employee share-ownership should be more common in countries with more centralised 
bargaining as most firms are tied to industry or national agreements that limit pay 
flexibility, whereas in decentralised countries, firms can exercise wage flexibility more 
straightforwardly through base pay as they are not tied to higher-level agreements. 
Moreover, even if  a particular workplace in a country with high-levels of collective 
bargaining is not formally part of a higher-level agreement, more rigid pay norms may 
exist (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011) limiting pay flexibility relative to countries with 
much lower rates of collective bargaining (Traxler et al., 2008). As such, the effect of 
country-level collective bargaining extends beyond workplaces that are formally part of 
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the process. Bryson et al. (2013) also report patterns with respect to country-level 
collective bargaining and incidence of incentives for the EU15 and the US.  
Since country-level collective bargaining alters the propensity to implement 
financial participation, we might expect financial participation to generally have larger 
productivity effect sizes in less unionised settings because organisations are generally 
freer to adopt such schemes or not – and decide on their payment systems in general 
depending on the expected effects, in a way similar to country-level diffusion through 
adjusting potential costs and benefits of adopting financial participation. However, once 
controlling for country-level incidences, which is considered as a separate factor in itself, 
collective bargaining coverage could still affect the functioning of financial participation. 
In countries where collective bargaining is more widespread in setting pay, and in 
influencing pay norms more generally, although financial participation may well be more 
common, incentives generally make up a smaller proportion of overall pay in countries 
with higher levels of collective bargaining (Boeri, 2014). Moreover, in such countries, 
incentive schemes offer less scope for lower wages when performance is poor, due to 
wage floors in collective agreements (Boeri, 2014: 17). Evidence also suggests incentive 
schemes are less responsive to performance in countries with higher levels of collective 
bargaining in that they offer less scope for higher wages due to wage constraints set out 
in agreements, with case study evidence demonstrating that incremental pay increases are 
often converted into a form of financial participation  (Traxler et al., 2008). This implies 
that the effect of financial participation on productivity should be weaker in countries 
where collective bargaining plays a greater role in pay-setting because not only do 
financial incentives make up a lower proportion of pay, they are more weakly related to 
performance, reducing motivational effects on employees. We expect financial 
participation to have larger effect sizes in countries where collective bargaining coverage 
is lower and weaker simply because establishments have more control over whether to 
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implement financial participation, but also more control over its functioning once 
adopted, offering proportionately greater payments that are more sensitive to performance 
as workplaces are not as constrained by collective agreements.  
Hypothesis 4. Collective bargaining coverage is negatively correlated with the efficacy 
of financial participation on labour productivity. 
The third country-level factor we derive from the literature concerns employment 
protection. Marsden and Belfield (2010), comparing the United Kingdom and France, 
argue that the greater use of contingent pay in France is due to the more stringent 
employment protection relative to the UK. They argue workplaces in the United 
Kingdom, with its weaker employment protection, are less likely to use financial 
incentives because they can more easily use the threat of dismissal as a disciplining 
device. In countries with stricter employment protection, workforce adjustments through 
dismissal are more costly, and so making use of financial incentives as a motivating 
device are relatively less costly. Thus without controlling for country-level diffusion of 
financial participation, we expect financial participation to have smaller effect sizes in 
countries with higher levels of employment protection because of the greater 
heterogeneity in workplaces that make use of it and stronger self-selection with respect 
to the productivity-enhancing effects in countries with lighter employment protection.  
Once country-level rates of diffusion are controlled, however, we expect 
employment protection to still be negatively correlated with the efficacy of financial 
participation because even though workplaces might be more likely to adopt financial 
participation, the effects of schemes on attracting, retaining, and motivating high ability 
workers might be reduced when employment protection is high (Bryson et al., 2013). In 
other words, since employment is more secure, the effects of incentives on productivity 
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in countries with high levels of employment protection will be smaller simply because 
there is less need to illicit commitment and retention of high ability employees. 
Even still, we recognise this final hypothesis is quite hypothetical, primarily 
because not much literature has investigated this. The association between employment 
protection and the efficacy of financial participation could run the other way. In countries 
with higher levels of employment protection, the effects of financial participation may be 
stronger because they are a longer-term incentive than piece rates and short-term bonuses, 
where a steady workforce will actually complement its functioning, as a high performance 
HRM literature suggesting employment guarantees as part of the parcel would predict 
(MacDuffy, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Becker and Huselid, 1998). In countries with 
lower levels of employment protection, the efficacy may therefore be weaker because the 
mechanisms by which financial participation (effort, commitment, monitoring, etc.) leads 
to higher productivity might work less well when employment is less secure because of a 
less stable workforce and incentives eliciting little extra effort over and above the higher 
threat of dismissal. Nonetheless, given the previous findings regarding incidence and our 
data are cross-sectional, we tentatively predict that efficacy should be weaker in countries 
with greater levels of employment protection.  
Hypothesis 5. Employment protection legislation is negatively correlated with the efficacy 
of financial participation on labour productivity. 
 
Data and Analytical Strategy 
The European Company Survey 
Data from the 2009 European Company Survey (ECS) – a representative survey of 
workplaces with 10 or more workers for all 28 European Union member states and two 
candidate countries (Macedonia and Turkey) commissioned by the European Foundation 
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for Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound, 2010). The ECS 
presents several advantages for our purposes. First, the country coverage is large, 
including many countries often not studied. Second, the sample is representative. The 
ECS contains around N=27,000 observations of unparalleled cross-country comparable 
information on workplace practices and outcomes. Workplace information was collected 
via a telephone survey based on a random stratified sample of workplaces with 10 or more 
employees drawn from workplace population registers, meaning our estimates pertain the 
whole population workplaces with 10 or more employees in each country (Eurofound, 
2010). Third, since it is an employer survey, responses, particularly on financial 
participation, are likely to be more accurate and complete than from employee surveys. 
Indeed, findings from an employee survey, the European Working Conditions Survey 
2005, indicate about a 10 per cent refusal rate for many countries on financial 
participation questions (Eurofound, 2007: 15). Furthermore, research in the United States 
found that even when employees respond to such questions the degree of misclassification 
is nonignorable. About one in five employees in the NBER study incorrectly reported that 
they are not covered by profit-sharing, with about one in seven incorrectly reporting that 
they are not covered by share-ownership (Budd, 2010). Being a workplace survey, the 
ECS also contains a rich set of workplace controls. 
The key independent variables are profit-sharing and employee share-ownership. 
The ECS contains information on whether the workplace offers these schemes as well as 
whether the schemes are open to all or specific categories of employees.3 Question 
wording for these variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. We restrict our 
sample to private sector workplaces outside of public service delivery (some of which are 
                                                          
3 We were only able to investigate the binary categories of the proportion of workforces covered by each 
scheme, but there are other areas of schemes that would be useful to have information on the size of the 
prize relative to usual pay, the frequency of payments, time horizon of payments, and the criteria 
determining pay out. 
    
 
15 
 
private sector). We also exclude Portugal from the analysis due to problems with the 
employee share-ownership variables. 4 We also exclude 81 cases with missing data. We 
are left with around 16,000 observations with a mean sample size in each country of 
N=905 (SD=398). 
Measuring workplace labour productivity 
Our productivity measure is based on a subjective rating made by the manager 
participating in the survey. Managers were asked: “Compared with other establishments 
in the same sector of activity, how would you assess the labour productivity in your 
establishment? Is it a lot better, somewhat better, about average, or below average for this 
sector?” We collapse the first two categories to one category and the latter two to another 
to create a binary dependent variable indicating whether relative productivity is above 
average (see Table A1).5 
The subjective nature of this variable could be viewed as a disadvantage. 
However, more objective measures of performance such as profit or value-added often 
suffer from their own problems such as high nonresponse in large-scale surveys because 
financial information is seen as confidential (even though surveys are confidential and 
anonymised), or refers to the organisation rather than particular establishments. 
                                                          
4 Descriptive statistics reveal an implausibly high incidence of employee share-ownership in Portugal – 
21.1 per cent – twice as high as the next country, Denmark. Misclassification might be the problem here, 
rather than sampling bias (the figure reported here is with sampling weights – without weights, it is still 
implausibly high). In the descriptive analysis for the official Eurofound European Workplace Survey 2009 
document, for the analysis of employee share ownership it states  “Portugal is not included in this analysis 
due to lack of comparable data” (Figure 38, p. 41). We therefore exclude Portugal from all analysis. Country 
estimates for all other countries, especially their rankings, closely resemble other available sources (Bryson 
et al. 2013; www.worker-participation.eu).  
5 We do this because of ease of presentation of Figures 1 to 3. Using the 4-point measure and ordinal logit 
regressions that yields separate average partial estimates for each level of response relative to the reference 
category results in many graphs. Our qualitative results are unaffected by whichever modelling strategy we 
use. 
    
 
16 
 
Furthermore, the data for the ECS was collected via a telephone survey, where item non-
response for this kind of information may be higher as managers may not have the 
requisite information readily at hand. Another advantage of subjective assessments is that 
they are more straightforward to compare across industries and especially across 
countries where differences in accounting procedures and quality may compromise the 
comparability of finance-based measures.  
The robustness of the subjective assessments of the economic outcomes in the 
ECS were checked with a validation exercise based on a separate postal questionnaire 
requesting specific financial information on representative samples drawn from a subset 
of countries, each representing a critical case for the main regions of Europe (Finland, 
Germany, Poland, Spain, and the UK). The study concluded “there is a good correlation 
between the subjective estimates and the actual situation”.6 Besides, similar subjective 
performance measures have been validated to a reasonable degree in the authoritative 
British Work Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) (Kersley et al., 2006: 294-303; 
Wall et al., 2004; Forth and McNabb, 2008). 
Analytical strategy 
Our analysis consists of two main steps. In the first step, we estimate the within-country 
effect sizes of financial participation on productivity, pooling all countries together. In 
this step, the aim is to establish whether there is a statistically significant association, net 
of controls and country fixed effects. In the second step (described in more detail in the 
next section), we explicitly model between-country variation in effect sizes. In both 
stages, we separately examine the effects of within-workplace coverage of both schemes 
                                                          
6 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/ecs/2009/financial.htm [accessed 10th November 2012]. 
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(whether some workers or all workers are covered by a scheme) as an additional source 
of variation in effect sizes. 
Since our data are cross-sectional, this poses challenges to the causal claims we 
can make about whether effect sizes of financial participation on labour productivity are 
causal. There is no definitive way to deal with these issues with our data. We take several 
steps to help mitigate against them. We control for a battery of confounders, some of 
which are intended to get a handle on longer term performance of workplaces.  We are 
able to control for the general “economic situation” of the establishment based on a 
subjective rating by management (whether very good, quite good, neither good nor bad, 
quite bad, or very bad), which can be loosely interpreted as profitability or capacity to 
share gains. We include two further variables as an indicator of longer-term workplace 
health. First, we include a control for employment growth over the three year period 
preceding the survey (whether it increased, stayed the same, or decreased). Second, we 
control for productivity growth over the last three years (whether it increased 
considerably, slightly increased, stayed the same, or decreased). Thus our results can be 
read as the association between financial participation and workplace productivity, net of 
current general workplace health and its recent variability (see Table A1 in Appendix for 
question wording for these three controls). These three subjective indicators were also 
validated by the same report referred to earlier (Gensicke et al., 2009). We also include a 
control variable in all our models for recent organisational change relating to changes to 
the remuneration system that should capture, if crudely, whether financial participation 
had been recently introduced. 
 In addition, we control for many factors that should correlate strongly with many 
possible omitted variables relating to workforce composition in all our models, for 
example the proportion of the workforce that is highly skilled, female, part-time, and on 
temporary contracts. There could be workplace practices that influence productivity that 
    
 
18 
 
are highly correlated with financial participation too. As a well-established human 
resource literature suggests, financial participation is complementary to high performance 
workplace and high-involvement work practices (MacDuffy, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 
1997; Becker and Huselid, 1998). We control for the presence of teamworking, the 
presence of self-managed teams, whether training is given to perform new tasks, whether 
training needs are checked periodically, the proportion of employees entitled to flexible 
working, the presence of workgroup performance-related pay, and the presence of 
individual performance-related pay. Although previous US research on financial 
participation finds it is complementary with employee involvement (Levine and Tyson, 
1990) but European evidence is somewhat less supportive (Poutsma et al., 2006; 
Pendleton et al., 2001), we control for presence of a union and presence of joint 
consultative committees. We also control for workplace size, whether the workplace is 
foreign-owned, industrial sector, and for a set of country dummies. Finally, we also 
conduct a matching procedure and test the sensitivity of the estimates to the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Modelling variation in effect sizes across countries 
We investigate three country-level factors: country-level incidence of financial 
participation, collective bargaining coverage, and employment protection legislation. 
Country-level rates of financial participation are captured by the proportion of workplaces 
in a given country participating in each financial participation scheme.7 Collective 
bargaining coverage is captured from the ECS data too. It is simply the proportion of 
                                                          
7 We also experimented with an alternative measure – the country-level fixed effects of propensity of 
adopting a particular financial participation scheme, net of all our workplace control variables – but country 
rankings barely altered using this alternative measure, nor did it affect our substantive results by substituting 
rates with this measure. 
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workplaces covered by collective bargaining agreements in each country.8 We prefer this 
measure rather than data from external sources such as the ICTWSS database (Visser, 
2013) because of limited availability in external databases of country-level collective 
bargaining coverage for the private and public sectors separately (our focus is private 
sector workplaces only), and the unit of analysis tends to be workers, not workplaces. 
Finally, employment protection legislation comes from the OECD employment 
protection legislation index for 2008, which is essentially a measure of ease of dismissal. 
Data for some non-OECD countries were collated from other sources that have 
constructed comparable indices (Laporšek and Primož, 2011; Eamets and Masso, 2005; 
Nesporova, 2011). 
 To model the relationship between these country-level factors and variation in 
effect sizes of financial participation on workplace labour productivity across countries, 
we adopt a two-stage multilevel approach (Lewis and Linzer, 2005). In the first step, we 
estimate the coefficients of each financial participation scheme on productivity by 
country, controlling for all the workplace-level factors mentioned in the previous section. 
These coefficients of particular financial participation schemes by country become the 
dependent variables for the second step (i.e. the effect sizes of financial participation, net 
of workplace-level controls). In the second step, the three country-level factors are the 
independent variables predicting the effect sizes of the different financial participation 
schemes across countries, correcting for the error in coefficients from the first step using 
feasible generalized least squares.9 We also present graphs of bivariate associations to 
                                                          
8 Results are insensitive to using the proportion of workers or workplaces as country rankings barely change 
across indicators. 
9 The two-step procedure was conducted using the edvreg program in Stata 13.0 available from 
http://svn.cluelessresearch.com/twostep/trunk/edvreg.ado [accessed 20th June 2013]. 
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facilitate interpretation of the relationships, the regressions inform us on their statistical 
significance when controlling for the other country-level factors. A multivariate strategy 
is necessary as to identify which country-level factor are driving the results, as they are 
likely to be correlated according to models of political economy clustering (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). 
 
Results 
The incidence of financial participation across Europe 
Table 1 shows the incidence of profit-sharing and employee share-ownership by country 
in the ECS. We present estimates of the proportion of workplaces in each country that 
have either financial participation scheme, as well as the proportion of workplaces where 
schemes are open to all employees. To get a better feel for incidence of financial 
participation, in the last five columns, we also present the estimates in the first five 
columns again but using an employee weight included in the ECS (instead of the 
establishment weight which is used in all other analysis) which weights estimates to 
pertain to the population of employees working in workplaces with 10 or more 
employees. 
[Table 1 about here] 
About 1 in 5 workers in the 29 European countries we examine are covered by at 
least one of the two schemes (and about one in six workplaces), which is slightly larger 
than the estimates in the literature (Bryson et al., 2013), probably due to our estimates 
being several years more recent and these schemes have been growing quite rapidly. 
These figures suggest about 1 in 5 workers work in a profit-sharing workplace and just 
fewer than 1 in 10 work in a workplace that offers employee share-ownership. As is 
documented in the incidence literature, there is a fair amount of variation in financial 
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participation across countries, as indicated by the coefficient of variation in country-level 
proportions in each column. Some countries’ levels are equivalent to the United States 
such as Sweden or Finland. Others are much greater such as France with respect to profit-
sharing. In several others, mainly Southern and Eastern European countries, financial 
participation is generally less well-developed.  
Multivariate analyses of financial participation and labour productivity 
The main pooled estimates are reported in Table 2.10 Here we model workplace labour 
productivity as a function of the incidence of both financial participation schemes (Panel 
A) and, separately, coverage (Panel B). To deal with country clustering, in Columns 1 
and 2, we use logit models with country fixed effects correcting standard errors for 
country clustering. In Column 3, we fit mixed effect logit models where effect sizes are 
free to vary across countries (Snijders and Bosker, 2012) to test the sensitivity of the fixed 
effects assumption. To give coefficients a probability interpretation, we report average 
partial effects (APEs) instead of raw logit coefficients. 
Column 1 of Panel A reports the relationship between the incidence of the two 
financial participation schemes, controlling for only country and industry fixed effects 
(the presumed reference categories against which productivity judgements are based). 
Column 2 includes the battery of workplace controls in addition to the fixed effects. In 
both columns, we find that profit-sharing has a statistically significant and positive effect 
on labour productivity, whilst employee share-ownership has no detectable effect. Once 
the effects of the two schemes are allowed to vary across countries we find that the 
significant effect of profit-sharing is slightly attenuated, indicating that there is some 
dispersion in effect sizes across countries (Column 3). The fact that profit-sharing is 
                                                          
10 Full results are in Table A2. 
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associated with higher labour productivity in these models supports the prediction made 
in Hypothesis 1. 
The effects uncovered in Panel A could mask important features regarding the 
design of both schemes, as detailed in Hypothesis 2. In Panel B, we repeat the analysis in 
Panel A, but this time examining their within-workplace coverage i.e. whether they are 
offered to specific categories of worker or whether they are offered to all employees.11 
When workplace factors are not controlled (Panel B, Column 1), profit-sharing open to 
specific categories and profit-sharing open to the whole workforce within workplaces are 
both found to have a statistically significant and positive relationship with productivity 
relative to workplaces with no profit-sharing. However, once other workplace factors are 
controlled (Columns 2), only profit-sharing with complete coverage remains significant, 
indicating that the effect of profit-sharing open to specific categories is explained by the 
workplace controls. Employee share-ownership remains unrelated to productivity – 
whether it is open to specific categories – or whether it covers the whole workforce. Thus 
we find support for Hypothesis 2, but only with respect to profit-sharing. When the 
financial participation variables are entered as random variables in a mixed effect logit, 
as with incidence, we find the significant effect of profit-sharing with complete coverage 
is attenuated slightly, again indicating dispersion in effect sizes across countries. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
As a final check on the robustness of this main result, we shift to a matching 
approach (Rubin, 1974). The two key advantages of matching methods over standard 
regression-based approaches are that they overcome the standard parametric assumptions 
                                                          
11 Unfortunately, the ECS does not give proportions of employees covered by both these schemes: only 
whether they are open to either all employees, or specific categories of employee. 
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and we can also implement tests to gauge the extent of the threat of unobserved 
heterogeneity on differences in outcome means between groups, given our data are cross-
sectional. Here, we treat each financial participation scheme as the “treatment” to estimate 
an average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) on labour productivity. The ATT shows 
the difference in average productivity for workplaces that have the scheme relative to a 
counterfactual if they did not have it. We match workplaces using the control variables 
listed underneath Table 2 using a recently developed algorithmic search method called 
“genetic matching.” The advantages of genetic matching over conventional methods are 
that it speciﬁcally creates matches that optimise balance and uses an algorithmic approach 
to achieve this, minimising common support issues (Diamond and Sekhon, forthcoming; 
Sekhon, 2011). Here, we present results for the same binary labour productivity coding 
of productivity ratings using the full set of controls.12 The results are reported in Column 
4 of Table 2. They results show the pooled results still hold using this alternative 
approach. In Table 3, we present results from a Rosenbaum sensitivity test to examine 
whether the statistically significant ATTs for profit-sharing are sensitive to any potential 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The test shows how much the probability of 
receiving the “treatment” needs to change to affect the statistical significance of the 
estimate of being “treated”. The lowest gamma value at which point a significant ATT 
stopped being significant at the 10 per cent level was 1.4 i.e. even if the odds of the 
presence of profit-sharing were 1.4 times higher due to some unobserved factors, the ATT 
would still remain significant at the 10 per cent level in the worst-performing model, 
indicating our key finding is robust. 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                          
12 Results using the four-category version of the dependent variable reveal qualitatively similar results for 
all of our analyses (available on request). 
    
 
24 
 
In sum, of the four variants of financial participation we investigate, Table 2 
indicates that profit-sharing is associated with better labour productivity but only when 
all workers are covered. No detectable effects for employee-share ownership are found 
once workplace factors are controlled.13 Main effects in pooled models may mask 
considerable and interesting dispersion across countries, and we now turn to examine the 
variation in effect sizes across countries. 
Variation in the effect sizes of financial participation schemes across Europe 
We use a two-stage procedure to investigate dispersion in APEs across countries and their 
correlation with three substantively important country-level factors. In the first stage, we 
estimate the APEs of the financial participation variables for each country, controlling for 
the battery of workplace controls (results listed in Table A3). In the second stage, we 
regress the country APEs of the efficacy of the all four variants of the financial 
participation variables on the three country-level factors. To being with, we descriptively 
analyses variation in the effect sizes on productivity of all four variants of financial 
participation, ranking countries by their APEs. A visual inspection of Figure 1, where 
within-country effect sizes are plotted by country and scheme type, along with the means 
and coefficients of variation of effect sizes, reveals that profit-sharing with complete 
coverage has on average the largest APEs across countries with the least variation (hence 
its significance in pooled models). Figure 1 generally reveals considerable variation in 
effect sizes, as well as revealing that all four variants of financial participation are 
                                                          
13 As mentioned, much of the previous research on employee share-ownership and employee attitudes and 
performance often finds important interaction effects, even if main effects are not always significant, as is 
the case here. We investigated many such interactions effects, for instance, with presence of training, 
teamworking, self-managed teams, and workplace climate – but none were significant (available on 
request). We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. Full regression results for 
Column 2 are reported in the Appendix A2. 
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associated with either no or positive APEs across countries, although negative effect sizes 
can be found in a few instances.14 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The results of the two-stage multivariate procedure are reported in Table 4 (profit-
sharing) and Table 5 (employee share-ownership). In each table, we examine each 
country-level factor on its own (Columns 1 to 3 for partial coverage and Columns 5 to 7 
for complete coverage) and together (Columns 4 and 8). To facilitate interpretation, we 
also plot the bivariate relationships of the country-level variables and the financial 
participation variants in Figure 2 (profit-sharing) and Figure 3 (employee share-
ownership). 
[Table 4 about here]  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Beginning with country-level rates of profit-sharing (Table 4), we find a positive 
but statistically nonsignificant association with country-level efficacy – whether the 
scheme is restricted to certain categories (Column 1) or open to all workers within a 
workplace (Column 5). The coefficients are reduced but still in the same direction when 
the other two country-level factors are controlled (Columns 4 and 8). Examining the 
bivariate plots in Panel A of Figure 2 reveals that part of the nonsignificance could be 
partly due to the considerable variation in country-level APEs. The graph reveals that in 
countries with very low levels of profit-sharing, the positive effect sizes are larger (mostly 
                                                          
14 Full regression results by country are found in Table A3. 
    
 
26 
 
Eastern and Southern European countries) than in countries with high rates of profit-
sharing (Scandinavian and Continental countries), where effect sizes are still positive, but 
smaller. There is also a cluster of countries with moderate levels of profit-sharing 
(Continental countries) where the effect sizes are mostly nonsignificant, or in the case of 
a small number of countries, negative. Thus the relationship between country-level rates 
of profit-sharing and the efficacy of profit-sharing is actually more u-shaped than linear, 
but with a degree of dispersion around this trend, only partially supporting the expectation 
of Hypothesis 3 that effects sizes will be larger in countries with lower rates of diffusion. 
The fact we observe some relatively larger effect sizes in countries with lower 
levels of country-level profit-sharing could indicate that these APEs are inflated 
somewhat by self-selection, as predicted. In countries with higher levels of profit-sharing 
where self-selection is likely to be less severe, particularly in France in the case of 
complete coverage of profit-sharing is mandatory for large organisations, we still find 
positive, albeit smaller, effect sizes. In summary, we find relatively smaller effect sizes 
in those countries where there is greater coercion or financial incentives to make use of 
profit-sharing. Effect sizes are generally larger and positive in countries where profit-
sharing is not as widespread, where self-selection into profit-sharing is more likely to be 
endemic, perhaps inflating effect sizes. The confidence intervals are also larger in such 
countries, so in the two-stage estimations in Table 4, they are given less weight. Panel A 
in Figure 2 reveals the efficacy of profit-sharing is generally more positive than negative 
and that positive effects are observed in more countries for complete coverage than is the 
case with partial coverage, as predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Turning to the relation between country-level rates of employee share-ownership 
in Table 5, we find country-level rates have a positive and nonsignificant correlation with 
the efficacy partial coverage of employee share-ownership. In the case of complete 
coverage, however, a negative and also nonsignificant correlation (Columns 4 and 8) is 
    
 
27 
 
found. The bivariate plots in Panel A of Figure 3 reveal that part of the reason for 
nonsignificance is due to the dispersion in effect sizes across countries, but in contrast to 
profit-sharing, also much wider confidence intervals of country-level estimates of the 
APEs of share-ownership on productivity, particularly in those countries with lower 
levels of employee share-ownership with complete coverage, partly due to small numbers 
of workplaces engaging in employee share-ownership in countries.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 [Figure 3 about here] 
Generally, we find larger effect sizes in countries where overall levels of 
employee share-ownership are low for both partial and complete coverage – where self-
selection is likely to be more endemic – but find less evidence of positive effect sizes in 
countries with high levels of employee share-ownership in terms of point estimates as 
compared to profit-sharing. The bivariate plots support the general finding in Table 2 that 
we find mostly no detectable effect on productivity in most countries, with many 
confidence intervals crossing zero on the x-axis. Importantly though, overall, we find 
little evidence of a negative association across countries. Overall, we generally, if 
anything, find more of a u-shaped trend between country-level rates of diffusion and 
efficacy than an overall negative correlation, in contrast to the predictions made by 
Hypothesis 3. 
In terms of collective bargaining coverage, Table 4 reveals a statistically 
significant and negative relationship for the efficacy of profit-sharing when it is restricted 
to specific categories of employees. The negative effect of collective bargaining coverage 
for the efficacy of partial profit-sharing finding still holds when country-level profit-
sharing and employment protection are held constant (Table 4, Column 4). Panel B of 
Figure 2, reveals generally positive and significant effect sizes in countries with low and 
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medium levels of collective bargaining coverage, and some significant and even negative 
effects in countries with high levels of collective bargaining coverage (Continental 
countries), with a smaller number of important exceptions (Slovenia and Finland).15 
When profit-sharing is workplace-wide, country-level collective bargaining coverage is 
too found to be negatively related with efficacy, but the correlation is nonsignificant in 
this case. Panel B of Figure 2 reveals that for countries with higher levels of collective 
bargaining coverage, the effect sizes of workplace-wide profit-sharing are less dispersed, 
but mostly nonsignificant. Taken together, these findings indicate that in countries with 
low collective bargaining coverage, where establishments generally have a freer choice 
in their payment systems, effect sizes of profit-sharing are generally greater. In countries 
with higher collective bargaining coverage, where establishments have less discretion 
over payment systems, even if the establishment itself is not covered by an agreement 
because of stronger pay norms (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011; Traxler et al., 2008; Boeri, 
2014). As hypothesised, even when country-level rates of profit-sharing are controlled, 
we still find a generally negative relationship as predicted. We thus find some evidence 
of a negative effect sizes, especially in the case of profit-sharing that is open to only 
specific categories of employee where a significant relationship is found, providing some 
support for Hypothesis 4. 
In terms of collective bargaining coverage and the efficacy of employee share-
ownership, Table 5 reveals a statistically significant but positive relationship when it is 
open to all employees, and even when country-level employee share-ownership is 
controlled. We also find a positive relationship between the efficacy of employee share-
                                                          
15 Interestingly, when the relationship between collective bargaining and the efficacy is investigated at the 
workplace-level, no association with collective bargaining is found. The same is true if we repeat the 
analysis with level of the collective agreement (establishment or higher) and found the same results. 
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ownership schemes that are open to specific categories and country-level collective 
bargaining coverage, but the effect is nonsignificant. When examining the plots in Panel 
B of Figure 3, the effects of employee share-ownership when it is open to specific 
categories of employee are mostly small and nonsignificant across countries, whereas in 
the case of when it is open to all employees, we find some strongly significant and large 
effects in some countries with high levels of collective bargaining coverage (Austria, 
Finland), which drive the overall positive correlation. The generally positive relationship 
between country-level collective bargaining coverage and efficacy of employee share-
ownership is in contrast to the prediction made by Hypothesis 4. We discuss some reasons 
we find contrasting results with respect to county-level collective bargaining and profit-
sharing and employee share-ownership in the next section. Overall, with respect to both 
types of financial participation, we do find that at least for three of the four variants of 
financial participation, collective bargaining coverage explains the largest share in the 
variance of APEs for three of the four variants of financial participation that we examine, 
meaning that it has greatest explanatory power in accounting for dispersion of efficacy 
across Europe. 
In terms of variation in efficacy according to strictness of employment protection, 
Table 4 reveals that effect sizes for profit-sharing (both partial coverage and complete 
coverage) are generally larger in countries with stricter employment protection, although 
this overall positive correlation between country-level protection and efficacy is 
nonsignificant. Panel C in Figure 2 reveals that there is much dispersion around this trend 
line, and the positive correlation is weak.  In terms of variation in the efficacy of employee 
share-ownership, a negative but nonsignificant correlation, is found (Table 5). Even 
excluding the outliers of the UK and Ireland with respect to employment protection, to 
the left of the graph (Panel C, Figure 3), does not change the association in this case. Thus 
our tentative predictions of a negative association are supported only for the case of 
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employee share-ownership, whereas a (weakly) positive association is found for the case 
of profit-sharing. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is only weakly supported overall. 
Nonetheless, we did note potentially countervailing predictions with respect to 
employment protection because in countries with higher levels of employment protection, 
financial participation may play a smaller role in attracting, retaining, and motivating 
employees because employment is generally more secure across all workplaces – which 
our results suggest is more the case for employee share-ownership. On the other hand, we 
also stated that financial participation may have stronger effects in countries with higher 
levels of employment protection, because ultimately, financial participation are a longer-
term incentive and so positive efficacy is more likely to be realised in countries with more 
stables workforces – which our results suggest is more the case for profit-sharing. Perhaps 
because of these countervailing effects, the model fit for employment protection in 
accounting for variation in efficacy across countries for all four variants of financial 
participation in Tables 4 and 5 is very poor, and this does not change using alternative 
measures of strictness of employment. 16  
 
Discussion 
The recent financial participation literature has begun to document the correlates of 
incidence of incentives and financial participation across countries (Bryson et al., 2013; 
Kalmi et al., 2013). This article extends this literature examining variation in effect sizes 
of financial participation on labour productivity across 29 European countries, and their 
                                                          
16 Using alternative indices such as the World Bank’s rigidity of employment index or the Frasier Institute’s 
ease of hiring and firing index yielded qualitatively similar results. We report the EPL as it is the most 
widely used index. 
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correlates with three country-level factors. When examining Europe as a whole in pooled 
models, we find that profit-sharing is most consistently associated with superior 
workplace productivity, especially when it covers all workers in a workplace. Employee 
share-ownership is found to generally have mostly no statistically significant effect on 
productivity across countries. Importantly, however, with all four variants of financial 
participation we consider, we find much variation across countries in efficacy, net of 
differences in workplace composition across countries. When we model this variation 
with three substantively important country-level variables, we find strongest support for 
the extent of country-level collective bargaining coverage as a key variable in accounting 
for variation in cross-country efficacy. 
Several key findings emerge. First, underlying findings from single-country 
studies, we find more support for positive effects of profit-sharing than employee share-
ownership across countries. The main difference between these two schemes is that with 
employee share-ownership workers normally have to hold onto shares for a period of time 
to achieve returns, and so a longer-term dependent variable might be a more appropriate 
measure and perhaps the reason we were unable to find much support when considering 
pooled estimates of Europe as a whole. Additionally, workers are often not gifted shares, 
which is normally the case with profit-sharing. Workers often have to give up something 
to obtain them, and this could have important implications for mechanisms such as gift-
exchange. More importantly, the employee share-ownership literature often finds that its 
productivity-enhancing effects come about through interactions with HR policies, such 
as high performance work systems or company culture, rather than through main effects 
(Blasi et al., 2013b; Kruse et al., 2012; Pendleton and Robinson, 2010). Perhaps partly 
because of this, we also find greater dispersion in effect sizes for employee share-
ownership than for profit-sharing leading to fewer significant effects. Second, the 
distinction between the schemes being open to certain categories of employee versus the 
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whole workplace is revealed to be a pertinent one in understanding variation in efficacy 
of financial participation. We find that positive effects are more likely to be observed 
when all workers are covered across a range of countries, echoing empirical evidence 
from single-country case studies (Pendleton and Robinson, 2010).  
Third, and most importantly, we demonstrate that there exists considerable 
variation in effect sizes of both schemes across Europe, net of workplace composition 
controls. Very little is known so far about what might explain this variation. Of the three 
country-level factors we consider, country-level collective bargaining coverage seems to 
play the largest role and indeed generally has the greatest explanatory power in 
accounting for variation in effect sizes of financial participation on labour productivity 
across Europe (at least judging by the R-squares in Tables 4 and 5). The two main findings 
that emerge in this regard are, first, effect sizes of partial profit-sharing are generally 
smaller in countries with greater collective bargaining coverage relative to countries with 
lower rates of coverage, and this relationship is statistically significant in the case of 
profit-sharing open to specific categories of employee. Second, larger effect sizes for 
employee share-ownership is observed in countries with greater levels of collective 
bargaining coverage, and this relationship is statistically significant in the case of 
employee share-ownership being open to all employees. 
The negative relation of country-level collective bargaining coverage with profit-
sharing might be due to a wider prevalence of collective agreements where incentives 
generally make up a lower proportion of overall pay and are less sensitive to short-run 
locations in profits or share values (Traxler et al., 2008; Boeri, 2014), especially 
downwardly given pay floors set by collective agreements. However, our findings do 
suggest that country-level bargaining coverage plays a somewhat positive role in the 
functioning of employee share-ownership schemes, especially when open to all 
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employees within a workplace, which contrast with our predictions which are consistent 
in the case of profit-sharing.  
One reason for the positive relationship between country-level collective 
bargaining coverage and employee share-ownership might be due to complementarity 
between country-level traditions of collective attitudes and democratic working practices 
and the productivity-enhancing mechanisms of financial participation, such as through 
commitment and worker co-monitoring. These mechanisms are particularly pertinent for 
employee share-ownership, a longer-term incentives. Countries with greater levels of 
collective bargaining generally have more extensive and formalised employee voice 
channels which negotiate over aspects of work other than pay, for instance, and these 
channels, reflected in country-level collective bargaining coverage, may well be 
complementary to the underlying mechanisms connecting employee share-ownership and 
productivity. Although European evidence is generally somewhat unsupportive  of a 
relationship between the incidence of representative voice channels and financial 
participation (Poutsma et al., 2006; Pendleton et al., 2001), there may be complementary 
performance effects (Poutsma et al., 2009; Levine and Tyson, 1990). Because we control 
for presence of joint consultative committees (JCCs) at the workplace-level in the 
analyses we present here (an indicator of representative voice), in other analyses (not 
shown) we do indeed find a positive interaction effect between the presence of a JCC and 
employee share-ownership and productivity, but not for profit-sharing. We leave this 
potentially facilitating effect of higher levels in country-level of collective bargaining for 
employee share-ownership for future research to investigate. 
 
Conclusions 
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In this article, we examined dispersion in effect sizes of profit-sharing and employee 
share-ownership on workplace labour productivity across countries and the extent to 
which variation can be accounted for by three substantively-important country-level 
factors. Ignoring variation across countries can lead to simplistic conclusions about the 
efficacy of financial participation schemes in pooled models where interesting country-
level variation is “controlled”. We therefore reinforce that cross-country variation is 
important. Focusing on effect sizes across countries gives insight into the possible role of 
country-level factors in determining efficacy.  
Of course, our results are tentative since our causal claims are limited by the cross-
sectional data and more longitudinal or randomised research is needed. This article 
provides the first step by simply estimate the variation in effect sizes of financial 
participation on labour productivity with a rich data source covering many more country 
contexts than is often studied, giving insight into how country-level factors may account 
for variation. We find most explanatory power for differences in levels of collective 
bargaining coverage across countries in this regard. Effect sizes are generally larger in 
countries with greater collective bargaining coverage in the case of employee share-
ownership, but are smaller in the case of profit-sharing. We interpret this as consistent 
with evidence that demonstrates incentives are less sensitive to short-run fluctuations in 
performance (e.g. profits) in countries with higher levels of collective bargaining 
coverage, but that the collective attitudes and employee voice channels related to country-
level collective bargaining facilitates the efficacy of employee share-ownership 
somewhat, but not profit-sharing, because it is a longer-term incentive. We hope that our 
contribution will stimulate more research in this area. 
Overall, we find the efficacy of both financial participation types are generally 
positive or nonsignificant across the many countries we examine, with very little evidence 
of negative effects. For concerns of fairness and growing inequality, it is important to 
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establish that forms of financial participation do not worsen workplace performance. To 
that we add, given European-level encouragement of financial participation, it is also 
important to map efficacy across countries too given the varied institutional landscapes. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1. Incidence of financial participation across Europe 
 % of workplaces with…  % of labour force working in a workplace 
with… 
 Any PS 100% 
PS 
Any 
ESO 
100% 
ESO 
Any PS 
or ESO 
 Any 
PS 
100% 
PS 
Any 
ESO 
100% 
ESO 
Any 
PS or 
ESO 
Austria 8.0 4.0 2.1 1.0 9.2  19.4 10.7 6.1 3.5 22.2 
Belgium 14.6 9.7 11.5 7.4 18.8  15.6 11.2 11.5 8.2 23.2 
Bulgaria 9.2 6.5 7.1 6.0 13.5  11.2 7.5 7.1 4.9 14.4 
Croatia 4.6 2.1 2.8 2.0 6.3  7.2 2.4 9.7 8.4 12.6 
Cyprus 5.6 2.3 3.5 1.1 8.4  9.9 4.9 7.1 2.2 13.5 
Czech Rep. 17.4 8.3 1.1 0.9 16.8  22.2 10.5 3.5 2.7 23.7 
Denmark 14.1 10.5 13.0 8.9 24.3  15.5 11.8 20.2 14.6 31.9 
Estonia 17.8 9.9 2.6 1.4 19  21.1 7.9 5.7 1.6 25.5 
Finland 22.8 17.0 5.0 2.0 25.5  33.2 28.4 9.5 2.5 38.6 
France 35.0 32.5 4.7 3.5 35.1  57.5 55.6 8.4 6.4 57.8 
Germany 14.1 8.3 2.8 2.3 15.6  18.9 12.7 5.8 5.4 22.1 
United Kingdom 8.3 5.1 6.2 2.2 12.7  11.0 6.7 10.3 6.3 18.1 
Greece 4.4 1.9 1.6 0.2 5.6  8.3 2.5 4.4 1.6 9.7 
Hungary 13.8 7.5 3.6 1.9 16.4  14.2 8.1 5.9 3.1 17.9 
Ireland 11.3 4.2 6.4 3.5 16.4  16.8 11.4 23.4 19.2 32.9 
Italy 3.4 1.5 3.9 1.4 6.0  7.1 3.6 5.4 2.5 10.3 
Latvia 10.3 5.1 3.9 1.5 13.5  13.2 5.7 5.4 3.4 17.4 
Lithuania 7.9 3.3 3.1 1.2 8.7  15.1 8.1 2.0 0.7 15.9 
Luxembourg 9.4 6.8 3.7 2.3 12  9.6 6.0 3.7 2.0 12.3 
Macedonia Rep. 15.9 10.8 5.2 3.3 18  16.0 8.5 9.7 7.1 20.1 
Malta 4.3 1.5 2.9 0.1 6.3  8.9 1.5 1.1 0.2 9.7 
Netherlands 28.0 22.5 5.6 0.7 31  32.7 27.7 8.5 3.0 37.4 
Poland 7.4 4.5 4.3 3.8 10.3  10.6 5.6 5.3 3.5 14.0 
Portugal 16.3 10.2 - - 16.3  17.2 10.0 - - 17.2 
Romania 7.3 3.7 11.5 2.6 13.9  10.8 5.8 12.4 4.8 18.0 
Slovak Rep. 16.6 8.7 2.7 1.8 16.7  21.7 12.1 2.9 6.2 22.4 
Slovenia 13.9 10.0 7.0 4.7 18.6  11.0 8.2 13.0 2.3 21.9 
Spain 16.9 11.7 3.4 2.1 18.9  17.4 11.2 5.8 8.1 20.8 
Sweden 24.1 18.7 11.2 5.1 29.5  28.9 22.6 14.8 4.1 37.0 
Turkey 5.3 2.3 4.8 0.2 9.1  6.3 2.3 3.9 6.9 9.2 
            
Europe as a 
whole 13.6 9.5 4.6 2.4 16.3 
 
20.1 15.2 7.6 5.1 24.3 
Mean (across 
countries) 12.9 8.4 5.1 2.6 15.7 
 
17.0 11.0 8.0 5.0 21.6 
Coefficient of 
variation × 100 
(across 
countries) 57.9 82.2 61.7 81.9 47.8 
 
61.4 96.6 63.5 80.9 49.9 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: Private sector establishments with 10 or more employees; estimates weighted using appropriate survey weights. PS = 
profit-sharing at establishment; ESO = employee share-ownership at establishment. 
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TABLE 2. Financial participation and APEs of reaching above average relative labour productivity 
 No 
workplace 
controls 
Workplace 
controls 
(FE) 
Workplace 
controls 
(RE) 
Matching 
(ATT) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Incidence 
Profit-sharing .0865*** 
(.02166) 
.0655*** 
(.0159) 
.0445*** 
(.0110) 
.0608*** 
Share-ownership .0250 
(.0176) 
.0021 
(.0217) 
.0070 
(.0162) 
.0059 
Pseudo-R2 / ICC .0290 0.119 .030  
N 16,141 16,141 16,141 16,141 
     
Panel B: Coverage 
Profit-sharing (ref. none) 
 Specific categories .0716*** 
(.0135) 
.0329 
(.0275) 
.0479 
(.0277) 
.0084 
 100% coverage .0953*** 
(.0297) 
.0829*** 
(.0205) 
.0418*** 
(.0131) 
.0631*** 
Employee share-ownership (ref. none) 
 Specific categories .0602 
(.0314) 
.0297 
(.0287) 
-.0150 
(.0236) 
.0248 
 100% coverage -.0111 
(.0311) 
-.0253 
(.0331) 
.0239 
(.0212) 
-.0724 
      
Pseudo-R2 / ICC .029 .119   .034  
N 16,114 16,114 16,114 16,114 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: Columns 1-3 use country fixed effects (29 dummies) and industry fixed effects (5 dummies) with a standard error 
correcting procedure, clustering on country. Column 3 specifies country effects as random variables and financial participation 
as random coefficients. Column 4 uses genetic matching to match workplaces to calculate the average effect of being treated 
on the treated (ATT) i.e. the difference in mean productivity between workplaces that make use of financial participation and 
the counterfactual productivity if they had not. Matching is based on all the variables listed below in addition to country and 
industry. ICC refers to the intra-class correlation coefficient which can be interpreted as the variation across countries. 
Workplace controls: Economic situation of establishment (5 dummies), employment growth (3 dummies), productivity growth 
(4 dummies), recent organisational change (5 dummies), proportion temporary workers (3 dummies), majority foreign-owned 
dummy, proportion part-time (7 dummies), per cent female (7 dummies), workplace size (5 dummies), proportion highly-
skilled (3 dummies), teamworking important dummy, presence of self-managed teams dummy, JCC dummy, union presence 
dummy, collective pay agreement level (3 dummies), individual performance-related pay dummy, group performance-related 
pay dummy,  training to perform new tasks dummy, training needs checked periodically dummy, proportion entitled to flexible 
working (4 dummies). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * p <.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
TABLE 3. Rosumbaum sensitivity analysis of 100% profit-sharing ATT 
Gamma 
value 
Lower 
bound p-
value 
Upper 
bound p-
value 
1.0 .000 .001 
1.1 .000 .011 
1.2 .000 .025 
1.3 .000 .033 
1.4 .000 .078 
1.5 .000 .104 
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TABLE 4. Country-level factors and the effect size of profit-sharing 
 Specific categories profit-sharing  100% profit-sharing coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Country-level profit-
sharing 
.0258 
(.0319) 
  .0313 
(.0317) 
 .0074 
(.0249) 
  .0144 
(.0294) 
Collective bargaining 
coverage 
 -.0731** 
(.0291) 
 -.0621** 
(.0307) 
  -.0148 
(.0278) 
 -.0287 
(.0334) 
Employment 
protection legislation 
  .0113 
(.0236) 
.0258 
(.0315) 
   .0113 
(.0293) 
.0154 
(.0305) 
          
Adjusted R2 .024 .190 .001 .216  .003 .019 .006 .039 
N 29 29 29 29  29 29 29 29 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: APEs obtained from a two-stage regression, see text. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * p <.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
TABLE 5. Country-level factors and the effect size of employee share-ownership 
 Specific categories employee share-ownership  100% employee share-ownership coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Country-level 
employee share-
ownership 
.0585 
(.0298) 
  .0383 
(.0314) 
 -.0344 
(.0211) 
  -.0296 
(.0224) 
Collective bargaining 
coverage 
 .0242 
(.0347) 
 .0187 
(.0326) 
  .0495** 
(.0170) 
 .0579* 
(.0294) 
Employment 
protection legislation 
  -.0135 
(.0308) 
-.0128 
(.0276) 
   .0135 
(.0292) 
-.0619 
(.0332) 
          
Adjusted R2 .248 .019 .008 .283  .099 .239 .008 .353 
N 29 29 29 29  29 29 29 29 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: APEs obtained from a two-stage regression, see text. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * p <.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1. Dispersion in APEs for profit-sharing and employee share-ownership across countries of achieving “better” 
or “a lot better” labour productivity 
Panel A. Profit-sharing 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
  
Mean (coefficient of variation) of APEs: .051 (3.356). Mean (coefficient of variation) of APEs: .081 (1.947). 
  
Panel B. Employee share-ownership 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
  
Mean (coefficient of variation) of APEs: -.012 (13.524). Mean (coefficient of variation) of APEs: .037 (4.147). 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: Dots are Average Partial Effects (APEs) obtained from within-country logit regressions with controls. Controls listed in notes under Table 
2. Plus signs are 95% confidence intervals. 
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FIGURE 2. Variation in APEs of profit-sharing on achieving “better” or “a lot better” labour productivity 
Panel A. Country-level support 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
 
 
  
Panel B. Collective bargaining coverage 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
  
  
Panel C. Employment protection legislation 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
  
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: Dots are Average Partial Effects (APEs) obtained from within-country logit regressions with controls. Controls listed in notes under Table 
2. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
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FIGURE 3. Variation in APEs of employee share-ownership on achieving “better” or “a lot better” labour productivity 
Panel A. Country-level support 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
  
  
Panel B. Collective bargaining coverage 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
  
 
Panel C. Employment protection legislation 
Specific categories 100% coverage 
 
 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: Dots are Average Partial Effects (APEs) obtained from within-country logit regressions with controls. Controls listed in notes under Table 
2. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1. Definition of key variables 
Variable name Survey question Coding Mean 
(SD) 
Dependent variable 
Labour 
productivity 
Compared with other establishments in the same 
sector of activity, how would you assess the labour 
productivity in your establishment? Is it a lot 
better, somewhat better, about average, or below 
average for this sector? 
First two 
categories = 1; 
latter two 
categories = 0 
.49 
(.50) 
Financial participation  variables 
Profit-sharing Is there any profit sharing scheme offered at this 
establishment? 
1 = yes; 0 = no See Table 
1 
Profit-sharing 
coverage 
Is this offered to all employees of your regular 
workforce or is it offered to employees in specific 
positions only? 
1 = not 
offered; 2 = 
specific 
categories; 
only 
3 =  all 
employees 
See Table 
1 
Employee 
share-
ownership 
Is there any share-ownership scheme offered in this 
establishment? 
1 = yes; 0 = no See Table 
1 
Employee 
share-
ownership 
coverage 
Is this offered to all employees of your regular 
workforce or is it offered to employees in specific 
positions only? 
1 = not 
offered; 2 = 
specific 
categories; 
only 
3 =  all 
employees 
See Table 
1 
Workplace health controls 
Economic 
situation 
How would you rate the economic situation of this 
establishment? Is it very good, quite good, neither 
good nor bad, quite bad, or very bad? 
5 categories, 
reverse coded. 
3.51 
(.89) 
Labour 
productivity 
growth 
And if you compare your establishment’s labour 
productivity to the situation 3 years ago. Has it 
increased considerably, has it slightly increased, 
has it remained about the same, or has it decreased 
since then? 
4 categories, 
reverse coded 
2.62 
(.99) 
Employment 
growth 
Has the total number of employees in your 
establishment increased, decreased, or stayed about 
the same over the past 3 years? 
1 = decreased; 
2 = stayed 
same; 3 = 
increased 
2.07 
(.79) 
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TABLE A2. Financial participation and above average relative labour productivity (full results) 
 Incidence Coverage 
 (1) (2) 
Profit-sharing .0655***                 
 (.0159)                 
Share-ownership .0021                 
 (.0217)                 
Profit-sharing: Specific categories  .0329 
  (.0275) 
Profit-sharing: 100% coverage  .0829*** 
   (.0205) 
Share-ownership: Specific categories  .0297 
  (.0287) 
Share-ownership: 100% coverage  -.0253 
  (.0331) 
Economic situation good or very good .0417 .0440    
 (.0665) (.0655)    
Productivity slightly increased or increased considerably .0404* .0410*   
 (.0269) (.0269)    
Increase in employment .0189 .0192    
 (.0290) (.0289)    
Workplace climate is good or very good .1515*** .1515*** 
 (.0353) (.0361)    
High absenteeism .0417 .0418    
 (.0491) (.0490)    
HR problems -.0156 -.0156    
 (.0096) (.0097)    
Workplace size (ref. 10-19)   
20 – 49 .0080 .0080    
 (.0130) (.0132)    
50 – 249  -.0187 -.0183    
 (.0276) (.0274)    
250 – 499  .0234 .0236    
 (.0209) (.0207)    
500+ .0200 .0199    
 (.0308) (.0302)    
Proportion of skilled workers (ref. none)   
<49% -.0169 -.0166    
 (.0146) (.0144)    
>40% .0509** .0509**  
 (.0168) (.0166)    
Presence of teamworking .1030*** .1032*** 
 (.0230) (.0230)    
Presence of self-managed teams .0202 .0208    
 (.0128) (.0130)    
JCC .0065 .0059    
 (.0154) (.0151)    
Union presence -.0679* -.0678*   
 (.0343) (.0338)    
Collective agreement .0396*** .0387*** 
 (.0102) (.0101)    
Some group pay .0114 .0125    
 (.0148) (.0142)    
Some individual PRP .0247 .0247*   
 (.0127) (.0126)    
Training checked regularly .0056 .0052    
 (.0119) (.0121)    
Training to do new tasks -.0026 -.0018    
 (.0105) (.0108)    
Flexible working .0138 .0135    
 (.0179) (.0179)    
Some temporary workers -.0104 -.0102    
 (.0143) (.0143)    
Foreign-owned .0360* .0369*   
 (.0150) (.0147)    
Part-time workers .0061 .0062    
 (.0205) (.0202)    
Majority female workers .0365 .0358    
 (.0297) (.0299)    
Recent organisational change .0234* .0233*   
 (.0091) (.0091) 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: Average Partial Effects (APEs) obtained from logit regressions with controls and country dummies. Controls listed in 
notes under Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * p <.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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TABLE A3. APEs of financial participation and above average relative labour productivity by 
country 
 
 
Source: European Company Survey 2009. 
Notes: Average Partial Effects (APEs) obtained from within-country logit regressions with controls. Controls listed in notes 
under Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * p <.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
            
           
Country Profit-sharing Employee share-
ownership 
Specific 
categories 
100% 
coverage 
Specific 
categories 
100% 
coverage 
Austria -0.216* -0.262** -0.257 0.289** 
 (0.094) (0.080) (0.181) (0.083) 
Belgium -0.271* 0.116 -0.192 0.147 
 (0.112) (0.105) (0.111) (0.116) 
Bulgaria 0.286 0.435*** 0.087 -0.043 
 (0.157) (0.086) (0.208) (0.043) 
Croatia -0.063 0.150 0.025 -0.019 
 (0.124) (0.981) (0.156) (0.150) 
Cyprus 0.291* 0.148 0.031 0.152 
 (0.103) (0.154) (0.213) (0.174) 
Czech Republic 0.053 -0.154 -0.148 -0.001 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.569) (0.189) 
Denmark -0.005 0.080 0.052 -0.076 
 (0.097) (0.063) (0.108) (0.068) 
Estonia -0.010 0.024 0.075 -0.259** 
 (0.096) (0.114) (0.250) (0.080) 
Finland 0.107 0.010 0.038 0.257* 
 (0.088) (0.053) (0.120) (0.103) 
France -0.209* 0.111* -0.027 -0.008 
 (0.088) (0.047) (0.157) (0.098) 
United Kingdom -0.092 0.050 0.195* 0.147 
 (0.088) (0.076) (0.084) (0.097) 
Germany 0.063 0.104 0.094 -0.140 
 (0.070) (0.052) (0.094) (0.087) 
Greece -0.047 0.307*** -0.089 0.026 
 (0.142) (0.076) (0.127) (0.186) 
Hungary 0.045 0.096 -0.285*** 0.124 
 (0.098) (0.118) (0.059) (0.166) 
Ireland 0.068 -0.074 -0.139 0.140 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.120) (0.147) 
Italy -0.283** 0.122 0.161 -0.123 
 (0.075) (0.132) (0.107) (0.157) 
Latvia 0.347** 0.410* 0.175 0.157 
 (0.093) (0.156) (0.258) (0.251) 
Lithuania 0.241 0.214 -0.065 -0.206 
 (0.196) (0.141) (0.358) (0.175) 
Luxembourg 0.143 0.113 -0.249 0.078 
 (0.155) (0.093) (0.131) (0.168) 
Macedonia Rep. -0.068 0.043 0.206 0.141 
 (0.127) (0.074) (0.171) (0.111) 
Malta 0.220 0.290 0.262 0.164 
 (0.172) (0.785) (0.192) (0.191) 
Netherlands 0.141 0.127 0.227* 0.230 
 (0.092) (0.062) (0.101) (0.117) 
Poland 0.063 -0.035 -0.181 0.071 
 (0.120) (0.080) (0.225) (0.097) 
Romania -0.048 0.005 0.033 -0.288* 
 (0.117) (0.100) (0.113) (0.119) 
Slovakia 0.153 -0.181 -0.252 0.070 
 (0.126) (0.139) (0.134) (0.181) 
Slovenia 0.319* -0.086 -0.177 0.011 
 (0.116) (0.106) (0.106) (0.207) 
Spain 0.068 -0.003 -0.006 0.060 
 (0.072) (0.056) (0.138) (0.122) 
Sweden -0.013 0.109 -0.008 0.045 
 (0.093) (0.054) (0.092) (0.113) 
Turkey 0.193* 0.074 0.073 -0.094 
 (0.073) (0.113) (0.084) (0.216) 
